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Preface to Jens B. Koepke's
"The University of California
Hate Speech Policy: A Good Heart
in Ill-Fitting Garb"*
According to the National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence,
racial harassment has been reported at more than 300 colleges in the last
five years. One out of five minority students is subjected to some form of
physical or psychological racial harassment every year. One out of three
of those victims re-experience harassment every year.'
The escalation of racial harassment and an atmosphere of racial tension are causing more black families to send their children to all-black
colleges.' This ominous threat to the educational opportunities of minorities occurs at a time when black and hispanic college students are already an endangered species. The natural response of many universities
has been to enact regulations sanctioning various forms of harassment.
The regulatory responses have raised difficult constitutional questions to
which a great deal of academic debate has been devoted.
Unfortunately, regulations alone, even if enacted within constitutional bounds, are of dubious efficacy, because they fail to address the
root causes of harassment-the rising tide of racism that seems to be
engulfing our post civil rights movement generation. Suppression of racist expression in and of itself cannot reach the hearts and minds of the
far too many students who are infected consciously or subconsciously
with racist beliefs and attitudes. The long-term solution to racist harassment on campus, if there is one, lies in education, not in suppression.
There is much universities can and must do to address the underlying racism among college students. 4 Too often, however, racist attacks
* Edward M. Chen, Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of
Northern California. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. RacialHarassmentAltering Blacks' Choices on Colleges, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1990, at

Al, col. 5.
2. Id.
3. In California, less than 2% of African-American and Latino ninth graders will complete a four-year college education in a public university. CALIFORNIA POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION COMMISSION, A PROSPECTUS FOR CALIFORNIA POST-SECONDARY EDUCATION,
1985-2000 (Oct. 31, 1985), exh. 27.
4. The observations and suggestions made herein about campus racism are meant to
apply to other forms of group-based hate directed against historically disadvantaged groups.
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are met with deafening silence by campus officials who typically downplay such incidents by blaming attacks on non-students (and, hence, are
outside the jurisdiction of the university) or by characterizing the incident as "isolated" (and thus, insignificant).5 Even if officials speak out
against racist acts, their words often amount to nothing more than lip
service, followed by no substantive action or serious re-examination of
the university's priorities, programs, and policies.
Although not the centerpiece of his proposal, Mr. Koepke correctly
notes that in addition to sanctioning harassment, college officials must
take pro-active steps to deal with this problem. University officials must
diversify curriculum and, as some universities such as Stanford have
done, move from a Eurocentric curriculum in favor of one that is more
balanced and diverse. Some universities now require all students to take
ethnic studies classes, e.g., by making students choose between three to
five ethnic group subjects as part of their mandatory courses for graduation. Students ignorant of our history of racial injustice and hostile to
affirmative action must be taught about the history of American race
relations, the struggle for civil rights, the principles of equality, and the
value of diversity.
Diversifying books and curriculums, however, can have limited effectiveness without true integration of faculty, students, and administrators. Teaching equality would be a hollow exercise if a university
maintains a segregated faculty, since the message of minority inferiority
implied by the lack of minority role models then overshadows the content of the curriculum. Moreover, the lack of a fully integrated student
body deprives the university and its students of perhaps the most effective educational tool, life experience and the sharing of perspectives from
a diverse student body that reflects our diverse society. 6 Hence, the phenomenon of racial harassment is inseparably related to larger issues of
institutionalized racism and affirmative action.
Pro-active educational efforts to mitigate racial harassment on campus by addressing the underlying causes of racism are fully consonant
with both the first and fourteenth amendments. Equality is vindicated by
the traditional first amendment cure for "bad speech," i.e., more speech.
Indeed, as Justice Powell pointed out in Bakke, the vindication of equality by diversifying the student body and faculty will also enhance first
5. The district court judge's characterization of a rash of racist incidents at the University of Michigan as "anything other than isolated and purposeless acts" (Doe v. University of
Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. Mich. 1989)) typifies the inability of many administrators

to appreciate the significance of racist harassment.
6. Cf Bakke v. Regents of the University of Cal., 438 U.S. 265, 312-14 (1978) (purposes
of affirmative action discussed in a reverse discrimination suit).
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amendment interests.7 Hence, much of the debate about the tension between free speech and equality is academic, and it is unfortunate that so
little attention has been focused on pro-active remedies.
On the other hand, the tension between the constitutional values of
speech and equality is not entirely academic and must be confronted.
Addressing the root causes of racism through education, while essential,
is not a sufficient response to the problem. Attitudes do not change overnight and, as the growing racism on college campuses itself suggests, occurring as it does twenty years after the civil rights movement, there is no
guarantee that the disease of racism will be completely eradicated by the
antidote of education. Sole reliance on the traditional first amendment
cure of "more speech" naively assumes that education will be 100 percent effective.
Moreover, the long-term solution fails to address the immediate injury suffered by minority students at the hands of racist perpetrators. It
is hardly comforting or meaningful to tell a black dormitory resident
traumatized by the carving of "KKK" on her door or ridiculed by her
fellow students that she can respond with more speech or that education
of racist perpetrators will someday end those attacks. The injury inflicted by racist harassment is sustained long before any anti-racist educational programs can take effect.
Equality concerns are not fully answered by traditional first amendment solutions, and it is at this point that tension exists between competing constitutional values. Mr. Koepke's Note correctly concludes that
there must be some accommodation of competing constitutional
concerns.
To be sure, civil libertarians are properly distrustful of any doctrinal
incursion upon the right of free expression. The perennial problem of the
"slippery slope" is a real one, as the recent spate of censorships of Robert
Mappelthorpe's photographs and 2 Live Crew's concerts under the guise
of obscenity demonstrates. In addition, permitting any suppression of
speech dangerously cedes power to authorities whose identities and philosophies are ever shifting and whose good intentions cannot always be
taken for granted. First amendment rights are largely indivisible; it is no
coincidence that civil rights and anti-war protestors in the 1960s and 70s
found first amendment protection under seminal cases such as Terminiello v. Chicago8 and Brandenburg v. Ohio,9 both of which vindicated
the free speech rights of racists.
7. Cf Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 58 U.S.L.W. 5053 (June 26, 1990) (racial plurality

in broadcasting enhances programmatic diversity).
8. 331 U.S. 1 (1949).
9. 345 U.S. 444 (1969).
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Yet, these concerns do not justify blind adherence to absolutism.
Averting the "slippery slope" implies that no restriction on speech could
ever be tolerated, no matter how compelling the countervailing interest
or how slight the first amendment value at stake.' And while there is a
danger that authorities will misuse the authority conferred upon them
and subvert the original purpose of a regulation (e.g., using the equal
protection clause to overturn affirmative action programs), no one would
seriously argue, for instance, that we should scuttle the fourteenth
amendment entirely because of our distrust of its current enforcers on the
Court.
Rather than absolutism, the risks inherent in the regulation of
speech suggest that any such restriction be subject to strict scrutiny; the
regulation must be "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and...
narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'" Such a "compelling interest"
exists where there are countervailing constitutional concerns that must
be balanced against the first amendment.' 2
There is a compelling interest in stemming racist harassment on college campuses which is severe enough to impair equal educational opportunity. The brutal force of a racist verbal attack upon a minority student
lies not merely in its offensive nature, but in the fact that its message
resonates with hundreds of years of societal defamation. Racial epithets,
even when launched by an individual, have historical content; the victim
is inevitably aware consciously or subconsciously that the epithet reflects
pervasive and deep-seated attitudes and beliefs harbored by many in the
dominant culture. These attacks capitalize on a power relationship
wherein the victim belongs to a group subjugated by the perpetrator's
group. There is a qualitative difference historically, socially, and psychologically between being called an "asshole" and a "nigger." The latter is
not only offensive, it is oppressive.
10. Even the ACLU, when faced with competing constitutional concerns, has sought to
strike a balance rather than adhere to an absolutist position. National ACLU Policy 6 permits
actions for libel by private individuals over matters which are not public issues provided certain evidentiary burdens are met. Policies 221 and 222(b) permit restrictions on prejudicial
pretrial publicity and broadcast of proceedings where fair trial or due process would be jeop-

ardized. Policy 303 permits the challenging of private associations that are racially segregated
where the result is to block access to fundamental rights or opportunities to participate in the
community. And, Policy 315a permits the outlawing of sexual harassment in the workplace if

purely verbal, provided the harassment is sufficiently severe.
11.

Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
12. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (associational rights v. equality); University of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 110 S.Ct. 360 (1990) (academic freedom v. equality); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 373 (1974) (speech v. privacy); Garrett Co. v. De Pasquale,
443 U.S. 368 (1979) (free press v. fair trial); Florida Star v. B.S.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989) (free
press v. privacy).
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The impact of such an attack is exacerbated by the isolation and
alienation many minority students feel on white-dominated college campuses, where the unspoken assumption by many whites is that students of
color are intellectually inferior, where cultural chasms and differences in
life experiences leave minorities feeling isolated, and where minority students too often find limited social support.
Unlike obscenity, traditional "fighting words," or defamation, racial
harassment severe enough to inflict psychic injury thereby impairs equal
educational opportunity and the constitutional values embodied in the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. Such harassment reflects a
"badge and incident of slavery,"" a and impedes the fourteenth amendment's promise of equality. 4 Moreover, there is an additional compelling interest in ensuring equal access to the "important" if not
"fundamental" right of education. 5 The combination of racially based
stigmatization with the impairment of access to a fundamental right provides a strong constitutional underpinning for the limited regulation of
harassment on college campuses.
The critical constitutional question is not whether there is sufficient
justification for rules prohibiting harassment, but whether any proposed
regulation is narrowly drawn and sufficiently clear so as to avoid the first
amendment problems of overbreadth and vagueness. The policy proposed by Mr. Koepke, which is similar to that endorsed by the California
affiliates of the ACLU, contains important limitations which insure that
regulation of racist speech is narrowly circumscribed.
The requirement that the insult be directly addressed to a particular
victim significantly narrows the reach of regulation. It is analogous to
the "face to face" requirement of the "fighting words" doctrine articulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.6 It excludes from the reach of
regulation racist speech or literature that is directed at the public gener17
ally, a limitation that has great constitutional significance.
13. Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1960).
14. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (eliminating discrimination against women and minorities is a "compelling state interest ... of the highest
order"); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (eliminating effects of
identifiable private and public race discrimination constitutes a "compelling" interest).
15. E.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1987); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d

1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
16. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
17. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 272 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting) (distinguishing group defamation law from individually directed insults); Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474, 486 (1988) ("The type of picketers banned by the Brookfield ordinance [upheld by
the Court] generally do not seek to disseminate a message to the general public, but to intrude
upon the targeted resident..."). Cf Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (protect-

ing Nazi march in front of Skokie Village Hall).
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The additional requirement that the speech be intended to insult or
harass a particular victim eliminates the vagueness and overbreadth that
inheres in policies such as that of the University of Michigan, which outlawed speech which "[i]nvolves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic efforts, [has the] reasonably foreseeable effect of
interfering with [those efforts, or creates] an intimidating, hostile, or
demeaning environment ....,"'1 Racist expression intended to advance
academic discourse rather than insult or harass a specific victim would be
protected even though a foreseeable effect may be the creation of a discomforting environment.' 9
The intent requirement ensures that what is unprotected-expression which has as its primary purpose the harassment of a specific victim
(as opposed to some academic, political, or artistic discourse directed at a
broader audience)-has minimal first amendment value. As the Supreme
Court has observed, "epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper
sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution." 2 0 "[S]uch utterances are no essential part of an exposition
of
2
idea[s] and are of... slight social value as a step to truth."1'
Requiring intent also eliminates vagueness and overbreadth, and intent is the traditional standard for imposing even criminal liability. This
requirement has saved the constitutionality of otherwise vague statutes.2 2
It thus provides substantial "breathing space" for protected expression;
indeed, it is more protective than the "actual malice" test for defamation.2 3 Similarly, purposeful intent to discriminate implicates maximum
equal protection interests.2 4
Mr. Koepke and others have demonstrated that there is a place for
campus regulation of some forms of harassment. But we should not lose
sight of the fact that racist harassment on college campuses requires a
two-prong approach of regulation and education to address both the
short- and long-term implications of campus racism. Neither can be effective without the other. The challenge of our Nation's campuses is not
simply to enact new codes of conduct that conform to constitutional limitations: the challenge is to find ways to deal with the root causes of
racism.
18. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
19. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (equal protection
violated only if discriminatory act is taken "because of and not merely in spite of" its discriminatory impact on a protected class).
20. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
21. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
22. E.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
23. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (discriminatory purpose rather than
discriminatory effect is necessary to finding a violation of equal protection clause).

